

## CENTRALIZATION—FEDERATION.

The American public and the American press are at present alone in the enviable position of being able to judge the events of Europe calmly and without passion. They alone are uninfected by prejudice or fear; they alone have clear insight into the chaotic confusion of European politics. Unity or union, centralization or confederation; between these Central Europe is hesitating. This is manifested in Italy by positive facts; in Germany by the discussions as well of professors, her self-constituted, theoretical statesmen, as of the practical statesmen in her Cabinets. Indeed, as many pens are busy in the peaceful discussion and solution of the question in Germany as there are of bayonets in Italy under the command of Garibaldi and of Panti. What in Italy is a fact, drawing into its whirlpool the Governments of most of the European States, is in Germany a menacing cloud, threatening new complications when it shall burst.

Centralization or federation is the vital question, for all the Italian Governments—for the new and half-formed, as well as for the old and established. France, Austria, and England are compelled to share in its discussion, the excitement being communicated to them like the reek of blood from the fields of Magenta and Solferino. Germany had brooded over it for centuries, and whenever the old fabric of European government is shaken, German start up from their speculations, endeavor to give them form and utterance, and to frighten away some or many of their rulers. The lucubrations of political philosophers, of historians and statesmen, team with projects and platforms, which are reechoed by the German press and by the more daring politicians. But the question seems as difficult of solution by the sword and the rifle cannon as by the protocols of diplomacy. The interests, general and special, of nationalities, tribes, clans, and families, dynastic and aristocratic positions and privileges, conflict with each other; good and bad passions enter in and complicate still more these complicated questions.

The present and the future, war or peace, configuration or orderly progress and development seem to depend on the solution. In this terrible clash of passions and interests it is natural that the best intentions should sometimes be carried astray, the firmest and clearest minds become clouded and shaken by the clamor of surging events. The American Press although it feels a warm and deep interest in the welfare of the European peoples, does not share in the excitement which veils the eyes of the actors, and defends their ears to the counsels of history, philosophy, and sound logic. So, more easily than any European press are we able to weigh and estimate, foresee, and forewarn, to appreciate the events and the expectations of European nations and to do this from an American, that is from a universal, a humane, and a peaceful standpoint.

The American Republic can in no way dread the increase in space or power of any one European nation or empire. Our security, our interests, political and material, cannot be jeopardized by them. England may lose India, the Ionian Islands, Gibraltar, or Malta, or acquire any new empire in any region of the globe, without endangering our existence. Neither would it harm us should France extend to the Rhine, annex Savoy, and make Italy a satrap; if the dreams of Scandinavian unity were realized, or if a modern Barbarossa, carrying the Hapsburg, or the Hohenlorenz, or Saxe-Gotha escutcheon, should issue from the cavern of Vymfhausen, establish a German empire overshadowing all Europe, and thus fulfill the warmest expectations of Teutonia's dreamy politicians; or, finally, if the Cossack should some day guard the Danube, the Oder, the Hellespont, and the mouth of the Peiho. Our existence in this hemisphere, as well as our relations with the old world, are independent, as well of geographical division of Europe as of the forms of government. This absence of interest clears the atmosphere for us, and makes it easy from given data to draw the horoscope of Europe.

We, as Americans, cannot for a moment hesitate between unity and union—between fusion, centralization, and federation. Our choice is made, and gloriously sustained by facts and events. But both these principles are to be judged as to their intrinsic value, and their adaptation to the normal progress, and to the development of the great and real interests of humanity.

Centralization was an agency of civilization in the crude, savage, warlike state of society. Still, it is at best a two-edged sword, as dangerous for the one who holds it as to him who is exposed to its blows. In the life, growth, and development of certain European nations centralization has been for a time a beneficial and salutary agency. For example, it has made France what it is by the working of the centuries, and by the centralizing instincts of the Valois and the Bourbons. By a still more condensed centralization the Convention saved the great French revolution from the assaults of combined Europe. But if Germany had been equally centralized in the sixteenth century, it is probable that Protestantism would have been crushed, as was Calvinism in France; for at the start Calvinism was spread almost as generally among the French as was the teaching of Luther among the Germans. We might give similar comparisons and illustrations from the history of Spain and Italy.

But we consider unity, centralization, and fusion as belonging wholly to the past, and therefore no longer vital or useful to nations at all advanced in civilization. Centralization is good for Russia, which has still to keep up a warfare socially and materially with barbarism and semi-barbarian elements and regions. But weighed in the scale of reason, centralization is but a temporary expedient, temporary even should it in some nations last for centuries longer.

The approach to a higher social condition of men and nations no longer depends on centralization. Its principal aim has been and is to concentrate brute material force, for brutal, violent purposes of conquest and subjugation. Not to that goal do we wish to see the activity of European nations directed. Wherever there is attack, there of necessity defense is called forth, and so resort was had to centralization likewise as a defensive armor. But with all this, centralization is in itself and in its development a degraded and degrading condition of society. In its best aspect it is always the will of one, or of a few concentrated by the use of power, to rule or direct the mass; it is always an artificial center or focus, as are all the capitals of Europe, which spread an influence mostly baneful over the country at large. The struggle between the two principles is old, very old, in the world's history, and has had various manifestations. Asia Minor, with its many nations and races, in antiquity was highly developed and cultivated. The Persian conquest brought centralization, crushed the prosperity and extinguished the culture of its

nations and cities. In the grand and brilliant life of Greece the Spartans represented centralization; the Athenians federation. The Athenians mainly resisted and broke Persian invasion. Not Spartans but Athenians made Greece the ever-luminous star on the horizon of nations.

Individual development, self-action, self-government, are impossible under any form of centralization. Toward them, however, gravitates the destinies of men. We do not quarrel with the past. What was done answered the exigencies of the times. But we can see no benefit in protracting the old world and applying it to new events—still less to new formations. It is our belief that the States and Empires now knit together most powerfully, in some way or other, will become decentralized; and for their unity, federation will be substituted. This is their future, however distant it may be.

Federation is civilization; it is for European nations a transition to a general self-government, to a higher and more perfect social condition. We shall attempt to show that federation is a normal, and healthful state for nations who, under the excitement of the moment, are most clamorous for unity, or centralization. We see clearly that for their security and peace federation gives as much, if not more, guaranty, even in the present condition of Europe with its cabinets and diplomats, its congresses, or conferences, as could be found in forming a great united Italian Kingdom, or a centralized German Empire; and finally that the future of the many small nationalities of Europe depend altogether on federation. GUROWSKI.

## ITALIAN AFFAIRS.

There appears to be another hitch in the Conferences at Zurich. It was supposed that they might at least result in settling the terms of the cession of Lombardy to Sardinia, and in the signature of a treaty of peace between the late belligerent Powers. There seems, however, to be an inherent difficulty in thus patching up a peace by halves. No treaty that could be signed would amount to anything, so long as it left unsettled so many and such important questions. As respects Central Italy, if only the fate of Modena and Tuscany were involved, the question might be of comparatively easy solution. The expelled princes, helpless themselves, have nobody to whom they can look to reinstate them by force, except Austria. But the hands of Austria are tied up, unless France consents to her intervention. The Emperor Napoleon seems, however, to be pledged, by his repeated assurances given to the deputations which have waited upon him, neither to join in nor to allow any armed interference for coercing the submission of the Duchies to the exiled princes. The agreement which he entered into at Villafranca was only, as he explains it, to extend his moral support to their restoration. That agreement, however, not only prevents him from giving at present any open encouragement to the proposed annexation of the Duchies to Sardinia, but obliges him to seem to discountenance and oppose it. Yet neither the King of Sardinia, who might be supposed to know something of the Emperor's real feelings in the matter, nor the people of the Duchies, seem to think that he is really very much indisposed to have the thing happen. Not only has he made no remonstrance against the encouragement which the King of Sardinia has extended to this movement; he stands quietly by and allows the people of the Duchies to assume the position of subjects of the King of Sardinia, administering justice in his name, and gradually perfecting the annexation, by adopting more and more the financial system and method of administration in force in that Kingdom. Should the people of the Duchies continue as decided in favor of this annexation as they have hitherto been, and should no party within the Duchies themselves speedily show itself—of which as yet there appear no signs—in favor of the exiled Princes, the Emperor could scarcely be willing to forfeit his Italian popularity, and the character at which he has aimed, of the liberator of Italy, by standing persistently in the way of a union which both parties so anxiously desire.

The case, however, of the Papal province of Romagna stands upon different grounds. The Pope, who has vastly greater resources than the exiled Dukes, is not in the least disposed to submit to any curtailment of his temporal dominions. He has not only dismissed the Sardinian Minister, by way of showing his sense of the encouragement given by Victor Emanuel to the revolted province, but has also leveled at the revolvers and their abettors an Allocution, which must be considered as an appeal to the Catholic sentiment of Europe to come to his rescue. In this document, he confounds his character as head of the Catholic Church with his character as a temporal sovereign. He assumes that his character as an absolute temporal prince is essential to—indeed, is part of—his position as sovereign Pontiff. He denounces all those concerned in the movement of Romagna toward annexation to Sardinia, not merely as revolted subjects, but as enemies of the Church. He repels, as deceitful and false, professions of respect and veneration for the supreme spiritual power and authority of the Roman Pontiff, on the part of the persons thus engaged in overthrowing his temporal power. This is an evident thrust at the King of Sardinia, who prefaced his reply to the deputies of Romagna with a declaration of that sort. Finally, he gives the Catholic universe, and the bishops particularly, to understand his total repugnance and opposition to everything that has been done in Romagna toward escaping from his temporal authority.

This appeal has been already responded to by several of the French bishops, who have called upon the faithful to put up prayers for the preservation of the Pope's temporal dominions, at the same time denouncing in strong terms all who seek in any way to circumscribe his temporal authority. The object of all this no doubt is to work upon the Emperor, who has in times past been greatly indebted to the Catholic clergy for their support, and who has always professed a profound reverence for the Catholic religion.

The latest intimation of the Emperor's sentiments and intentions is to be found in a short but very significant answer, on occasion of his recent visit to Bordeaux, to an address made to him by the Cardinal Archbishop of that diocese. This address was in substance an appeal to the Emperor's catholicity to do again what he had done once already—to step forward to the rescue of the Papacy, to stop the ever "rising tide of revolution," and to restore to the vicar of Jesus Christ the integrity of his temporal power. "Deplorable events and sacrilegious acts," so the Archbishop declared, have not shaken his confidence, or that of his clergy, who rely, next to God, upon the Emperor to meet the crisis, difficult as it is, and to act in the spirit of his former declaration, that the

temporal sovereignty of the head of the Church is intimately connected with the fame of Catholicism and the liberty and independence of Italy.

The Emperor in his reply takes very adroit advantage of this quotation to suggest that for the sustentation of the temporal power of the Holy Father the rest of the world must be made to share his confidence that it is not opposed to the liberty and independence of Italy—the implication being that essential changes in policy and administration are necessary to place the Papal dominion on a firm footing. He significantly refers to the approaching withdrawal of the French army from Rome, demanded by the voice of Europe, as leaving the Pope the choice only between conciliating his subjects on the one hand, and anarchy and revolution on the other. The intimation is clear and strong that if the Pope expects to retain his temporal authority, it must be by relying upon the presence of a foreign force in his capital, but upon the good will and voluntary submission and support of his own subjects. The recent demonstration at Rome in honor of the Sardinian Ambassador—more than ten thousand persons having called and left their cards at his residence, preliminary to his departure—indicates pretty strongly that but for the presence of the French troops, Rome would follow the example of Romagna.

## THE PACIFIC RAILROAD.

We propose to consider at this time the political or National necessity and use for a Railroad from the Missouri to the Pacific.

1. The Federal Government is now paying some Twenty-five Millions per annum for Military service, mainly west of the Mississippi. Nearly half of this heavy bill is paid for Transportation in its various shapes—for the conveyance of Provisions, Munitions, &c., to the Army in Utah and in the various posts scattered through the Indian country; for Horses, Mules and Wagons, required to facilitate the conveyance of soldiers, arms, munitions and baggage from post to post, &c., &c. Every regiment employed in the Indian country on the Pacific costs the Treasury at least \$1,000 per man per annum, of which we estimate that nearly half would be saved by a Pacific Railroad. Certainly, the saving from this source could not fall short of Five Millions per annum.

2. But the efficacy, the power of an armed force, in the defense and protection of a vast empire, depends less on its numbers than on its mobility—on the facility with which it can be conveyed to the point at which it may at any time be wanted. For instance: our Government has now some Six to Eight Thousand Regulars scattered over Nebraska, Kansas, New Mexico, Northern Texas, Utah, California, Oregon, and Washington. These Six or Eight Thousand are not as efficient as Two Thousand would be if it were in the power of the Government instantly to transfer that Two Thousand, by a mere order, to the point at which they might at any time be wanted. A Pacific Railroad would not, indeed, fully effect this; but it would go far toward it.

3. Suppose our little Army, now largely concentrated in Utah, were urgently needed to repel some sudden danger, whether on the Pacific or the Atlantic coast: It would be a good three months' work to provide the needed animals and remove that force to either seaboard. But, with a Pacific Railroad, the whole might be in New-York, Charleston, New Orleans, or San Francisco, within a fortnight after the order was dispatched by telegraph from the War Department at Washington. The value of this facility of movement can hardly be overestimated.

4. At present, the regiments employed on the Pacific are almost or quite wholly raised and recruited in the Atlantic States. Their removal thence to their destination costs largely, heavily, in direct expense, and in that time which is money. Suppose a regiment to cost Half a Million per annum, and that six months are now consumed in sending it from Baltimore to Puget Sound, while one month would suffice with a Pacific Railroad: In addition to the saving on the present cost of its transportation, the saving in the time of that regiment would be \$200,000 directly, and practically much more; as a part of the cost of recruiting, drilling, &c., now lost in the tedious transportation, would be saved by the accelerated movement.

5. In case of war with any great maritime power, in the absence of a Pacific Railroad, we should be compelled either to surrender the Pacific States to subjugation and spoliation or maintain a double armament at enormous cost. Our army on this side of the Rocky Mountains would be utterly ineffective as against an expedition launched against the Pacific coast, and vice versa. But, with a Pacific Railroad, and the Telegraph which would inevitably accompany it, it would be morally impossible that an expedition directed against either seaboard should not be anticipated in its arrival by the concentration to oppose its landing of our soldiers drawn from every part of the country. Our Government, in aiding the construction of such Road, would inevitably stipulate for its use—exclusive, if required—in times of public peril, and would thus be enabled to transfer fifty thousand men from either coast to the other in the course of twenty or thirty days.

6. We have already expended some scores of millions of dollars on Fortifications, and are urgently required to expend as many more. Especially on the Pacific is their construction pressing demanded. We do not decide how fast nor how far this demand may or should be responded to; but we do say that a Pacific Railroad, whereby the riflemen of the mountains could be brought to the Pacific within three days, and those of the Missouri within ten, would afford more security to San Francisco than ever so many gigantic and costly fortifications.

But enough on this head.

—The social, moral, and intellectual blessings of a Pacific Railroad can hardly be glanced at within the limits of an article. Suffice it for the present that we merely suggest them.

1. Our Mails are now carried to and from California by steamships, via Panama, in twenty to thirty days, starting once a fortnight. The average time of transit from writers throughout the Atlantic States to their correspondents on the Pacific exceeds thirty days. With a Pacific Railroad, this would be reduced to ten; for the letters written in Illinois or Michigan would reach their destinations in the Mining Countries of California quicker than letters sent from New-York or Philadelphia would reach San Francisco. With a daily mail by railroad from each of our Atlantic cities to and from California, it is hardly possible that the amount of both letters and printed matter transmitted, and consequently of postage, should not be speedily quadrupled.

2. The first need of California to-day is a large influx of intelligent, capable, virtuous women. With a Railroad to the Pacific, avoiding the mis-

eries and perils of six thousand miles of ocean transportation, and making the transit a pleasant and interesting overland journey of ten days, at a reduced cost, we cannot doubt that the migration of this class would be immensely accelerated and increased. With wages for all kinds of women's work at least thrice as high on the Pacific as in this quarter, and with larger opportunities for honorable and fit settlement in life, we cannot doubt that tens of thousands would annually cross the Plains, to the signal benefit of California and of the whole country, as well as the improvement of their own fortunes and the profit of the Railroad.

3. Thousands now staying in California, expecting to "go home" so soon as they shall have somewhat improved their circumstances, would send or come for their families and settle on the Pacific for life, if a Railroad were opened. Tens of thousands who have been to California and come back, unwilling either to live away from their families or to expose them to the present hardships of migration thither, would return with all they have, prepared to spend their remaining days in the Land of Gold, if there were a Pacific Railroad.

4. Education is the vital want of California, second to its need of true Women. School-books, and all the material of Education, are now scarce and dear there. Almost all books sell there twice as high as here, and many of the best are scarcely obtainable at any rate. With the Pacific Railroad, all this would be changed for the better. The proportion of school-houses to grog-shops would rapidly increase. All the elements of moral and religious melioration would be multiplied. Tens of thousands of our best citizens would visit the Pacific coast, receiving novel ideas and impressions, to their own profit and that of the people thus visited. Civilization, intelligence, refinement, on both sides of the Mountains—still more, in the Great Basin inclosed by them—would receive a new and immense impulse, and the Union would acquire a greater accession of strength, power, endurance, and true glory, than it would from the acquisition of the whole continent down to Cape Horn.

Fellow-citizens! let us have the Pacific Road, and not leave the glory of its construction to our grandchildren!

We will consider the ways and means in another and concluding article.

## THE COTTON SUPREMACY.

Advices from various parts of Africa speak of increased attention to the raising of Cotton and preparing it for shipment. From Cape Coast and Sierra Leone, there are advices to the middle of July, which state that Cotton was being collected in the eastern districts of the gold coast, and that a considerable quantity would be shipped to England. The natives were rapidly learning its commercial value. At Kpong, a small town on the bank of the Volta, four tons had been collected, and more was known to be coming in from the interior. Accounts from other places refer to large quantities which would also be shipped to England. At the last National Fair in Liberia, it was manifest that Cotton, Sugar, and Coffee would soon become staple articles of export. More than a dozen samples of Cotton were exhibited in competition for the premiums offered. Some of these were well ginned and cleaned, and some were of fine texture and long and silky staple. Specimens were exhibited from trees grown from American seed planted eight years ago, the same trees continuing to produce an annual crop. In this particular, the Africans possess an immense advantage over the cotton-growers of this country. Other specimens were exhibited produced from American seed planted last year. But the principal lots were of native African Cotton, accompanied with many pieces of native cloth, socks and stockings. Beautiful specimens of the latter were shown, made from the staple of the native Cotton tree, which grows wild in the forest, and reaches a height of 80 to 100 feet. But of native African Cotton there are numerous varieties, from which these people annually manufacture many thousands of pieces of cloth, which they bring to the coast towns for sale or exchange. All these cloths come from the interior, where Cotton is known to abound, and where a vast population of industrious workers, now measurably free from the wars fomented by the slave-dealer, are impatient to open up commerce with foreign nations. England is annually making more systematic efforts to reach these people, and supply them from the looms of Manchester, taking Cotton in exchange. In a few years, she will undoubtedly enter into possession of the vast traffic which Africa is thus capable of supporting, and all this immense region, now supplied with cloth produced by native labor at a penny a day, will be glutted by the products of the power-loom. The same mighty revolution which her machinery effected in India will assuredly be re-enacted in Africa. Meanwhile, our own Government, devoured with a mean ambition to perpetuate power, either for itself or for creatures of its own selection, shuts its eyes to the vast opening for commerce and manufactures which the recent lifting of the veil from Africa has disclosed, and leaves other nations to enter into possession. It is possible that Cotton may some day be King in Africa as well as here.

The whole import of Cotton into England in 1857 was 296,000,000 pounds more than the import of 1843. Of this increase only 50,000,000 pounds was derived from this country, showing clearly that at her bidding Cotton will flow into her ports from every region where it is grown, and that in the long run she is not more helplessly dependent on us than we are on her. An embargo on the staple would occasion no greater convulsion there than here. While in these fourteen years she drew 80,000,000 of increase from us, India alone furnished her the astonishing increase of 185,000,000 of pounds—more than twice as much. The capacity of India to increase her production of Cotton is thus shown to be immensely elastic, and far greater than that of this country. She has millions of laborers where we have only thousands. No doubt the war in that country, by arresting cultivation and breaking up intercourse, has checked the increase of English importation, and created the drain on our market which has sent up prices and kept them there to this time, though they now begin to flutter. But with the return of peace the whole trade will revive. Steamboats are being placed on Indian rivers, and railroad-building, to facilitate the cotton transit, is being vigorously prosecuted; and as this system in our Southern States gave astonishing impulse to its cultivation, it must operate as potentially in securing the same result in India. In the same period of fourteen years referred to, Brazil sent an increase of 14,000,000 pounds to England, Egypt of 13,000,000, and the import of "other countries" rose from 3,135,000 pounds in 1843, to 8,000,000 in 1857. This comparatively small item from "other countries" was principally from Afri-

ca. But, though the item shows an increase of nearly 300 per cent., it is certain that the increase of 1858 from Africa was far greater in proportion. The increased amount imported into England from the United States during fourteen years was 15 per cent.; from Brazil the increase was 54 per cent.; from Egypt 140 per cent., and from India 288 per cent., showing conclusively that the power of increase exists with greater energy in all other cotton-growing countries than in the United States. Great as it has shown itself in this country, it has been outstripped by every other. Our cotton-brokers have been accustomed to devote their attention too exclusively to the figures of our own crop, and, while glorifying our capacity for production, have failed to give proper attention to that of other countries. In all these, the price of labor is stationary, while in ours it is advancing. Cotton hands are annually increasing in price, more of them are called for, and hence the crusade for reopening the slave-trade. There must be some great preponderating cause at the bottom of this striking capacity of other countries to increase their production so much more rapidly than our own. This cause must be found in the continued low price of labor, and the creation of new facilities for bringing interior grown cotton to the sea-board. What changes the latter may produce are shown in the growth of Memphis, Tennessee, which, under the influence of cotton-bearing railroads, has risen from a hamlet of 50 inhabitants to a city of 25,000, at which a tenth of the whole crop of the Union is received and shipped. Cotton is not produced in Tennessee with greater facility than in India, but it has been stimulated to its present magnitude by steamboats and railroads, all which are being rapidly established in the latter, and it is impossible that they should fail to work as mightily a revolution there. We know that India cotton is generally of inferior quality, and requires a better article, like the American, to enable English spinners to work it up. But we know also that invention does not stand still. Let the Indian staple once press on the Manchester market, and machinery will be adapted to work it up without the American adjunct. In any event, it will not be thrown away. Once landed in England, it will be worked up without any mixture, or with less proportion of the American. Be it which you will, to that extent it will displace our own.

The ability of England to absorb the cotton of the world being apparently established by these figures, it becomes a curious inquiry to know how she disposes of it. First, in 1856 and 1857, she exported nearly 2,000,000,000 yards, worth \$145,000,000. Of this the United States bought 385,000,000 yards, though the whole could have been manufactured as cheaply and as well by ourselves. Turkey took 308,000,000 yards—a country now utterly bankrupt from the destruction of industry by being gorged with foreign manufactures. Industrious Holland took 65,000,000 yards, preferring to weave her own cloth. But on India England forced the enormous quantity of 948,000,000 yards. There British Free Trade rules with despotic rigor. The same system prevails in her intercourse with us, wherever she can buy or bully us into submitting; and our industry, like that of Turkey, is giving way under the pressure. Our import of English calicoes alone has risen from 30,000,000 to 180,000,000 of yards annually; and, with dependencies like India, and dollars like Turkey and the United States, it can be no astonishment that England absorbs the cotton of the world. She lets in all raw materials free of duty; her manufacturers enjoy unequal advantages for competing with all other nations, by the fostering spirit of the laws; and the labor of her millions, bestowed on these raw materials, enables her to subsidize the world. To keep her manufacturers employed, she excludes the fabrics of other countries. She has required her dead to be buried in woolen, that one branch might be made to flourish, and at one time made the exportation of raw materials a felony. Buying nothing that she can make, and importing nothing she can produce, she has outstripped all competition, and is now the manufacturing colossus of the universe. Through all changes of time, of kings and parties, she has held to this policy of protecting her own industry. Our feeble rivalry she has crushed, by forcing on us the reverse of her own policy, in doing which she has found no scarcity of allies among Northern doughfaces. She has conquered our naturally superior position for supremacy in the cotton manufacture, and is now the great custodian of the staple; dictating prices to the grower; debauching our people with Free Trade; compelling us to dig gold in California and Kansas to make her rich, and wielding the Slave Power of one section to crush out the industry of the other. While living in Colonial bondage, we endured these evils by compulsion; now we adopt them voluntarily.

## THE HON. N. P. TALLMADGE.

Under this name, a writer over the signature "X," in THE TRIBUNE of the 15th inst., complains that in a recent notice of the character and political career of the Hon. Albert H. Tracy, injustice was done to Mr. Tallmadge's political course, and of "personalities" toward that gentleman. In reply to the latter accusation, I state that I am unconscious of making any "personal" allusions to Mr. T. at all; certainly none were intended; and for his personal character, even "X" can have no greater respect or consideration than myself.

It was in a political relation only that Mr. Tallmadge was alluded to. No complaint was made of the fact that he was desirous to obtain the nomination for Vice President at Harrisburg; and, from the manner in which "X" relates the affair, if he relates all he knows, he knows less about it than some others do. In Mr. T.'s aspirations to that office, he did not at all overrate his own ability for the discharge of its duties, or for the Chief Executive office either; for I believe him to be altogether a greater, a more consistent, and a better man than his last two incumbents. Nor did I complain that Mr. Tallmadge did not choose to be an entire Whig after his election to the Senate by the Whig party. I only spoke of the "mistake" which the Whigs made in confiding to him as one on whom they could rely in all party exigencies, and alluded to his second Senatorial career but as a part of the political history of the times.

The entire history of the Administrations of General Harrison and Mr. Tyler has yet to be written—it is hoped, by an unprejudiced mind; and when, strange developments will be made of the acts and aims of men in whom such acts and aims have never been suspected by their devoted partisans. Meantime, I am among the last to object that the "Conservative" friends of Mr. Tallmadge should award to him all the credit they choose for the policy of the measures, and the distinguished ability with which he advocated them on the floor of the Senate. They may deny also, and justly too, any affiliation on his part with the designing band of political camp-followers, who break off from the Whig party—"Cow-boys" in principle—always sure to bring up in the enemy's pay-roll at last, and with whom Mr. Tallmadge should not for a moment be associated. His course was his own. A.

October 29, 1859.

Mr. A. Root is an agent for the sale of THE TRIBUNE in Hartford, Connecticut.

## THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY THE HARPER'S FERRY AFFAIR.

To the Editor of the N. Y. Tribune.

SIR: There is at present much alarm, true or affected, in respect to the recent transaction at Harper's Ferry. There may be a question, however, whether the real danger is seen and apprehended as it ought to be. It may take some words to explain this. There is in this country a most peculiar institution, to say the least, of questionable morality. There are no good reasons for regarding it as a serious political evil. Even when acknowledged to be local, and claiming to be let alone on that very ground, it was still regarded, and justly regarded, as having more or less a bearing upon the general welfare. Since then it has passed those bounds and claims to be national. It demands introduction, as a matter of right, into every new Territory, and protection there, irrespective of any national or local legislation to the contrary. It claims to be a good, *per se*, and not an evil, although history shows that it has destroyed every nation that has ever cherished it. A power connected with it, and drawing its own strength from it, has, undesirably, for many long years controlled the Administration, the legislation, and at last obtained full possession of the judiciary of the nation. This institution has connected with it certain most vital and inseparable consequences. It carries in its train, wherever introduced, evils other than the great and primary evil. In every new Territory or State into which it comes this comes along with it—a gross inequality of political representation, injurious to other members of the confederacy. There comes with it, inevitably, just that state of insecurity, and that consequent peril, which has been lately brought to the public notice in so striking a manner.

It is admitted by its very advocates that every new community in which this institution is permitted to get a footing places itself, and all its future interests, over a smoldering political volcano. Undeniable facts have proved that in such a community, too, there can be no free discussion, no free press, no free church. All this goes in its train; and all this shows how extensive are its bearings, and what interest attaches to it, not only in the localities where it is so socially cherished, but in even the remotest parts of the United Nation. It has other consequences, more indirect, indeed, but none the less deeply affecting the political rights of other members of the confederacy. It claims that what it calls property, though it be by the common consent of mankind unnatural property, shall be property everywhere, while what other States make citizenship shall be citizenship nowhere out of such States. In other words, that the one thing, though the lower thing in its best aspect, though unnatural in this particular species, though designedly left unmentioned in the Constitution, shall be national, while the higher thing, citizenship, though expressly mentioned and protected therein, shall not be national at all. The man whom Georgia makes a slave may be carried as a slave, and held as a slave, in Nebraska; the man—the same man it may be—whom Vermont makes a citizen, cannot go as a citizen to Nebraska, or to any other State. This is a gross and flagrant violation of fundamental political ideas, and for such paradoxes has this Slave Power succeeded in obtaining the sanction of the Judiciary which itself has imposed upon the nation.

Now, in this fair and undeniable statement, we have four nullifying items; we have said nothing of its domestic immorality, of the startling fact that it shuts out millions of men—yes, men, sons of Adam and human brothers of Christ—from the most common rights of humanity. Our argument is satisfied with its national bearings, and the perversion of ideas it has introduced, and seeks to render permanent and stable. Considerable power is on the advance; it has destroyed national compromise; it has occasioned foreign wars; it has demoralized our politics; it has, in short, become not a local merely, but a great national evil.

So at least think a very large portion of the best men and best thinkers of our day. There is no logical or constitutional reason why a party should not be formed against it in the very States where it locally exists, though such party would, of course, be immediately crushed and put down by force. But in the Union at large such a party has at length arisen. It is opposed to this slave power (a thing, by the way, quite distinct from Slavery itself) solely on its national aspects. It demands that there should be a stop put to its further extension, that the overgrown domination which it has so long exercised in every department of the Government should be diminished, that the rights of other States should be reversed. It maintains that as there is an undoubted conflict of ideas, and one or the other must give way, servitude must be pronounced local and freedom national; that property in man must be regarded as special, while citizenship, and the right of each State to make citizens should be left as free, and universal as the Constitution expressly says it shall be.

Now, to say the least, these are great questions, worthy of a great, an intelligent, a moral, and a conservative party, such a party as has not as yet been formed, and such a party as are defined and sustained by the issues they present, banks and tariffs, and "regular nominations," and "party usages," and the spoils of office, and cheating platforms, and everything of the kind that has heretofore divided parties among us, sink into insignificance. There is a grandeur in the discussion; there is a grandeur in the issue. It is not a question of small men, that have done so much to dwarf as well as corrupt our national mind; it introduces us into the broad arena of history; it demands the investigation of some of the deepest questions of political philosophy; it involves constitutional questions, yes, those deeper ones that lie back of constitutions, even the ultimate sovereignty of nationality, and of the inherent duty of every nation to preserve itself.

Such are the questions, and such the party. It is honorable to those who take the other side that they should have such a party in antagonism. But here comes in the strange fact, to which we would call special attention, in so out of the course of all parties and all history. Here comes the preposterous issue, superseding, in fact, the other issue of Slavery extension, and now for the first time made. Such a party, it is gravely maintained, must not, ought not to be allowed. It is not simply that it must be opposed, as a party, but it must not be permitted to exist, or to be much. It is declared that we notice this as the first and most foolish of all the opposing arguments. Such a party is prevented by the force and Lynch law of a majority from holding any meetings in some of the States; and then it is seriously maintained, that it should not exist at all, because it is not universal. It is just the same as though the people of Vermont, in indignant retaliation, should prevent any Democratic caucus from being held among them, and then claim that Democrats should be disbanded everywhere, because their party has not its full organization in every State of the Union.

But the Republican party is not to exist in any way and on any ground. (On this grandest of historical and national questions, no party is to be formed at all. It is to be utterly tabooed, under peril of revolt. Every other matter affecting or not affecting our national welfare may be discussed, but here no argument, and no discussion is to be permitted. To set up such a discussion, to join a party on such grounds, though ever so legal and constitutional in its action, to attempt through such organization any public or political influence on our Congress or any part of the administration of our Government, this is sectional; this is fanatical; this can sense be allowed; no arguments may be made, no compromise may be broken, citizenship may be denied, the grossest violation may be offered to the most essential "State rights." Slavery may be declared national, Congress may be invoked to protect it, but there must be no opposition, no organized resistance; the questions are not to be discussed; the rights of other States are not to be touched; Slavery side of them is too plain to be discussed; the side who call it a question are not to be allowed; and as to the Constitution, that may take place in any part of the Union.

The question of the extension of Slavery presents, it is indeed, a great issue, but here is one still greater; this is the right of forming a party against such extension of Slavery. It is not to be determined: shall this question be in all its bearings, be they ever so general, ever so national, ever so deeply affecting the present or future welfare of the whole Confederation, or of any future additions to it—shall this be a subject, the only subject, on which no political party can be formed, and on which no political action ever be allowed? Shall the no-organize policy they say is the only one to be followed, and all thinking men should look it steadily in the face. Even those who may regard the institution as not being the evil which the world holds it to be, have still an interest in the affirmative side, and one which should influence their vote. Is there a power in this country that can thus taboo any political question, and be one in favor of Freedom, then that power may, perhaps, sometimes change sides. Can the power of all political issues be thus put under the ban? Then we say that even the danger of insurrection is not a greater proof of the monstrous political evil